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ABSTRACT 
Since the approval of Spain’s 2012 National Budget on March 30, 2012, some doubts and 
controversies have added up to many fears in the private sector regarding the measures and 
stimuli that the Spanish government was going to undertake. At the same time, this situation was 
in some measure aggravated by the financial backlog of many small and medium companies, 
which are and will continue, in the following years to be completely unable to comply with their 
financial requirements. 
In line with Boronat Ombuena’s (2009a, 2009b, 2010, 2012) requirements in his new approach 
to finance and private sector liaisons, the purpose of this paper is to analyze the recent years of 
the credit sector in Spain as well as its direct and mid-term effects that its mergers and 
acquisitions (M&A) have contributed up to date, and will still produce in the near future. We will 
take a closer look at the evolution of the banking sector in Spain from 1995 to 2012 through a 
historically-based methodology, compiling and synthesizing the existing financial and risk 
market information and analyzing its evolution.  
We shall observe that in a single year, the total number of savings banks in Spain decreased from 
45 to only 15 entities and that the risks the financial system took over these last few years were 
not equally distributed across the entities, resulting in an advanced foreclosure of the regional 
savings banks and in a market-share growth for the commercial banking entities. 
This process has resulted in creating larger entities and, in some cases, a vacuum of regional and 
local credit entities that in the mid-long term will eventually end up in a representative loss on 
credit availability. These circumstances call into question the need for a paradigm change and 
most importantly, new approaches to solve the new challenges that can result in the financial 
fluidity of the system and the eventual recovery of the economic structure. 
Keywords: Spanish banking sector, savings banks, financial crisis, tax adjustments convergence, 
mergers and acquisitions, M&A, Spain. 
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1. INTRODUCTION: THE CREDIT SYSTEM EVOLUTION IN SPAIN 
The early years of this decade have become a challenge for the already-used economic models 
and the common uses of the financial markets. We have been able to see old market strategies fail 
and old banking procedures be completely inadequate for the ever-changing needs of the new 
paradigm and requirements of the private business sector. However, these challenges are the 
result of changes that have been taking place from late 1995. 
Since the end of the last decade, Spain has slowly been changing its economic model, specifically 
modifying the banking procedures and credit requirements of core capital in order to restructure 
its own market, industries and budgetary assignments as a whole. 
Whereas in other countries such changes had been undertaken many years in advance, we could 
still see big financial players in the Spanish banking system which had other legal strategies that 
seem to be unknown to other countries. We talk about significantly different legal structures and 
different credit-concerning procedures. 
In Spain, since the late eighteenth century, the earlier Italian model of the fifteenth century of the 
impounding houses of pious character started to grow (although history would take us back to the 
year 1834, to the Spanish town of Jerez de la Frontera (Cadiz, Spain), with the “Sacred and royal 
impounding house of the souls of the purgatory of Madrid”). Later on, after more than a century 
of existence, such structures started to evolve in the mid-nineteenth century to the actual German 
Sparkasse-model-like based entities, that is, a public banking system working as banks with local 
and regional interests and centred in a non-profit and regional compromised entities with large 
reinvestment and public service programs. 
Nevertheless, such models started to modify their original commitment, which was only to lend 
small loans for specific personal purposes, not competing with larger and more professionalized 
banks for the business market and commercial loans to the large private sector investment groups. 
These entities were nominated Savings Banks (Savings Bank or Caja, in Spanish, or Caixa, in 
Catalan language equivalent) and were specialized in accepting savings deposits and granting 
loans. 
These changes ended up in the opening of their own regional enclosed interests in favour of a 
nationwide expansion that started mainly after 1992 with three entities ahead of the rest, the 
Madrid-based Caja Madrid, the Barcelona-based Caixa Catalunya and the Leon-based Caja 
Castilla-León, among many others that we shall later expose and analyse. The nation-wide 
assault began with the creation of hundreds of micro-offices in every corner of large and later 
medium-sized cities. This expansion model wanted to export the regional and proximity-based 
model of the original entities while giving them a larger impact in the economy as a whole. 
On the other side of the spectrum we could find a more-efficient and more professionalized 
banking system which entities were growing or had been restructuring themselves for more than 
a decade, creating large banking conglomerates that we know of today, such as the BBVA (Banco 
de Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria) (the merging result of the historical banks in Spain such as the 
Bank of Bilbao, Bank of Vizcaya, and also the Argentaria Group, which itself was the nationwide 
group of the industrial investment state banks such as the Bank of External Commerce -BEX-, 
Bank of local Credit -BC- and many others, also we found the best known BSCH (Banco de 
Santander Central Hispano), as well as the natural evolution from the following three private 
entities: Bank of Santander, Central Bank, and Hispano Bank. This “Central Bank” or “Banco 
Central” was a private entity with this name, a small commercial bank significantly different 
from the important concept associated with the Central Bank of a country, and in the case of 
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Spain it is officially named Banco de España or Central Bank of Spain (BDE). In the new context 
of the European Union, the role of the central bank of the Spanish economy has changed 
significantly in the last years (Jaime & Hernández-Carrión, 2012). 
The end result of this evolution has been that in almost fifteen years, by the beginning of the 
twentieth century, the banking map in Spain had been completely overhauled. There was no real 
difference in products or goals between savings and commercial banks and by then, the credit 
mass had grown to a spectacular rate, nearly one hundred thousand new employees had been 
hired in new offices in all Spain (adding also the new foreign banks that opened in the expansion 
period), resulting in an office or ATM machine in every corner of every city or town. 
 
 
2. CHRONOLOGICAL EVOLUTION FOR THE 1995-2012 PERIOD 
In the early years of the twentieth century, very few mergers had taken place of any strategic 
importance at the national or regional level. We could only start to see small mergers and small 
acquisitions by other entities, however, except for the Cajamar conglomerate, there was no entity 
big enough to modify the credit access or fluency in any region by itself.  This would later change 
in regions like the Valencian Community, which, as the foremost example of the national 
intervention and bank nationalisation, would eventually lose the three larger credit institutions in 
its soil, the Bank of Valencia, the CAM (Savings bank from Alicante and Murcia, previously 
known as Caja de Ahorros de Alicante y Murcia) and Bancaja (former Savings bank from the 
provinces of Valencia region, or Caja de Ahorros de Valencia, Castellón y Alicante). 
However, if we continue to analyse this evolution, we can clearly see that after 2009, large 
conglomerates were created, ending in the actual chain of events. 
We shall not endeavour in analysing the internal pros, cons or even wrongdoings in every-single 
entity, however, in recent studies (Climent Serrano, 2012), there has been a reasonable consensus 
that there have been many causes that have led to the actual financial crisis.Firstly, those of 
internal origin: 
i. Capacity excess 
ii. Non-levered housing investment 
iii. Excessive and disproportionate growth  
iv. Large levered operations based on non-profitable operations 
v. Doubtful credits ending in excessive depreciations and amortizations affecting the banking 
system cash flow. 
vi. Benefit depletion ending in insolvency situations. 
Furthermore, there have also been external causes to all this change and late developments, such 
as: 
i. Negative GDP evolution of the EU countries in general and Spain in particular. 
ii. Unemployment rate well above the 20% figure during the process, continuously readjusting 
the demand to a lower local optimum giving the industrial offer curve little to no time to 
readjust its means, prices or qualities, ending suddenly in many cases in a structural excess 
in production.  
iii. State value inversion demise  
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iv. Regulation system modification that subsequently changed most of the financial variables 
in the model. 
Following 2009, several mergers started to really take place and change the regional and national 
financial landscape, regional savings banks started either to purchase banks due to the legal 
framework then in place. It was impossible to do it the other way round, since savings banks had 
no legal core or legal force and therefore were outside the mercantile legislation -due to their 
particular history- whereas banks were -and still are- specialized companies that function in the 
financial market.  
 
Figure 1. Chronological Evolution of the M&A operations in the Spanish banking system (First 
stage from 1995 to 2009)  
 
 
2.1 Spanish banking and financial system evolution in 2009  
03.29.2009 - CCM (Caja Castilla La Mancha) is shut down and intervened after the merger with 
the Andalusian Unicaja savings bank. 
 
05.26.2009 - The then Spanish President, Mr. Rodriguez Zapatero (of the Socialist Party PSOE), 
starts the Fund for Orderly Bank Restructuring FROB or Fondo de Reestructuración Ordenada 
Chronological Evolution
Cajasur - (Caja de Ahorros and Monte de Piedad de Córdoba)
CaixaNova - (Caja de Ahorros de Ourense, Vigo and Pontevedra)
CajaNavarra - (Caja de Ahorros de Navarra and Caja de Ahorros Municipal de Pamplona)
Nueva Caja Rural Almería y Málaga - (Cajas Rurales de Almería and Málaga )
Caja de Ahorros de Carlet integrates into Bancaja
Multicaja - (Cajas Rurales de Huesca y Zaragoza )
Cajasol - (Caja de Ahorros de Huelva y Sevilla and la C.A Provincial San Fernando de Sevilla y Jerez)
Caja Rioja - (Caja de Ahorros Inmaculada and la Caja insular de Ahorros  de Canarias)  - FAIL
Caja Castilla la Mancha integrates into Cajastur
Grupo Cooperativo Cajamar - (Cajamar Caja Rural, Caja Campo and Caja Rural de Casinos)
1995
1999
2000
2001
2002
2007
2009
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Bancaria) which aims to manage the restructuring and resolution of credit institutions and 
strengthen the resources of these in the integration processes. 
These reforms invested 7,550 million Euros through the FROB, although total recapitalization of 
entities was 13,389 million Euros, compared to 15,152 million Euros initially planned. 
This process was done via the legal framework provided by the Royal Decree-law 9/2009 (RD 
Law 9/2009 or Law Fund for Orderly Bank Restructuring), and Royal Decree Law 11/2010 
(Banks Act) and Royal Decree Law 2/2011 (Act Recapitalization). 
 
13.08.2009 - The Bank of Andalusia (Banco de Andalucía) delisted in the Spanish stock market, 
after successfully culminating the merger of the subsidiary Andalusian by the Banco Popular. 
 
03.11.2009 - The Bank of Spain (Central Bank of the country, officially nominated Banco de 
España belonging to the Governing Council of the European Central Bank or ECB) approved the 
integration of CCM in Cajastur. 
 
12.11.2009 - The Bank of Spain authorized the establishment of Cajamar Cooperative Group 
(Cajamar, Caja Rural, Caja Campo and Caja Rural de Casinos) as the first merger under the SIP 
formula made in Spain. 
 
2.2 Spanish banking and financial system evolution in 2010 
03.25.2010 - Unnim savings bank receives aid from FROB passing to be in full control. 
 
05.11.2010 - The Andalusian savings banks Unicaja and Caja de Jaen constitute a new entity 
after the signing of the merger deed. 
 
05.22.2010 - Cajasur is then intervened after the merger with Unicaja is rejected and asks for help 
for an amount over 500 million Euros to FROB. 
 
07.01.2010 - The two major mergers of Catalan banks, Catalunya Caixa (Caixa Catalunya, 
Tarragona and Manresa) and Unnim (integrated by the savings banks from Manlleu, Sabadell and 
Terrassa) started their operational activity. 
The governing councils of Caixa Rural Cajamar and Balearic Caixa agree to merge. 
 
07.16.2010 - Cajasur is awarded to the Basque savings bank BBK (Bilbao Bizkaia Kutxa). 
 
09.18.2010 - Shareholders' meetings of Banco Sabadell and Banco Guipuzcoano agree their 
integration in the first merger of any kind of Spanish banking for more than a decade. Banco 
Sabadell acquires Banco Guipuzcoano. 
 
09.21.2010 - CCM savings bank becomes a commercial Bank (participated by 75% by the 
Cajastur Group and by 25% by the CCM Foundation). 
 
01.10.2010 - Caja España Duero savings bank, as a result of Caja Duero and Caja España, 
officially merge. 
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04.10.2010 - The National Competition Commission approved the merger of Caja Guadalajara 
by Cajasol, which supposed the first interregional integration of savings banks in Spain. 
 
12.01.2010 - Novacaixagalicia, the resulting savings bank from the merger of Caixa Galicia and 
Caixanova started operating after its registration in the commercial register and became a bank 
by September 14, 2011. Novacaixagalicia was operated by 93% by the FROB and is pending 
auction or tender for adjudication. It has received aid worth of 2,465 million euros. 
 
12.20.2010 - The presidents of Cajamar and Caixa de Balears formalise Rural notarized the deed 
of merger of both entities. 
 
12.22.2010 - Grupo Banco Mare Nostrum (the resulting integration of Caja Murcia, Caja 
Granada, Sa Nostra, Caixa Penedès and a SIP) obtains commercial banking operations 
authorisation. 
 
2.3 Spanish banking and financial system evolution in 2011 
01.01.2011 - La Caixa savings bank completes the merger of Caixa Girona. 
 
01.01.2011 – The year 2011 marks the beginning of operations of the new group of Finance and 
Savings Bank called Bankia. The SIP of Caja Madrid, Bancaja, Caixa Laietana, Caja de Avila, 
Caja Insular de Canarias, Caja Segovia and Caja Rioja, whose new trademark is Bankia. 
 
01.03.2011 - BBK Bank starts operating and trading. 
 
01.26.2011 - Banca Civica (the SIP of Caja Navarra, Caja Canarias, Caja Burgos and Cajasol) 
starts with operational capacity to handle new customers. 
 
04.06.2011 - Banco Base savings bank (cold fusion provided between the Mediterranean-CAM 
savings bank, Cajastur and other savings banks from Extremadura and Cantabria) settled their 
project, while acquiring the CAM bank tab, finally intervened on 22 July of the same year. 
 
06.29.2011 - Cajastur, CCM Bank, Caja Extremadura and Caja Cantabria assemblies approve the 
transfer of financial assets to the new bank (subsequently called Liberbank), created under the 
SIP formula. 
 
07.22.2011 - Mediterranean Savings Bank (CAM) is intervened after failing integration with 
Cajastur, Caja Cantabria and Caja Extremadura in the Bank Base. The Alicante-based bank was 
forced to ask 2,800 million euros to the FROB. The Bank of Spain now has a credit line of EUR 
3,000 million for its feasibility and was capitalized with 2,800 million euros, so that the state 
controls between 80 and 85% of its capital. 
 
09.30.2011 - CatalunyaCaixa passes to the FROB which now controls 90% of its capital in the 
state after injecting 1,719 million Euros. 
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07.10.2011 - Banco Popular communicates to the National Securities Market Value Commission 
(CNMV) its claim to control all of the Banco Pastor through a process of absorption. 
 
20.10.2011 - General meetings of the three Basque savings banks, BBK, Vital Kutxa and approve 
their integration to create Kutxabank bank, which will begin operating on January 2, 2012. 
 
11.21.2011 Bank of SpainintervenesBanco de Valencia after the forced resignation of its 
operators and injects 1.000 million Euros through FROB to ensure its viability and 2.000 million 
to ensure its liquidity. 
 
11.23.2011 - The Caja3 savings bank reports to the CNMV the segregation of business of Caja 
Inmaculada (CAI), Caja Círculo de Burgos and Caja Badajoz for their organization. 
 
12.07.2011 - The Bank of Spain informs that the Mediterranean Savings Bank (CAM) has been 
bought in an open public auction by Banco Sabadell. 
 
2.4 Spanish banking and financial system evolution in 2012 
02.03.2012 - The new president in office, Mr. Mariano Rajoy, from the Conservative Party 
(Partido Popular or PP), holds his first reform with the approval of the Royal Decree Law for the 
reorganization of the financial system, which required financial institutions to increase by 50,000 
million Euros its provisions in order to withstand the complete risk of their real estate assets and 
pushing some of the already existing entities to new mergers and acquisitions. 
 
02.29.2012 - The Ibercaja savings bank and Caja3 boards agree to initiate the process of merging 
in their banking business. 
 
07.03.2012 - The Bank of Spain decrees that Unnim (merger of Caixa Sabadell, Terrassa and 
Manlleu) is won by open public auction by the BBVA (Banco de Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria) for 
one euro and helps Deposit Guarantee Fund in the amount of 953 million euros. 
 
03.30.2012 - The boards of Unicaja and Caja España-Duero (CEISS) approve the integration 
and complete absorbing process of the Andalusian entity (Unicaja) by the Castile and Leon 
region savings bank. 
 
04.18.2012 - The boards of Caixabank and Banca Civica (Caja Navarra, Caja Canarias, Caja 
Burgos and Cajasol) approved their proposed merger. 
 
05.09.2012 - The Minister of Economy and Competitiveness, Luis de Guindos (PP), announces 
the nationalization of 100% of Financial and Savings Bank, the Bankia bank matrix, which will 
be controlled by 45% of the latter company. Bankia, by this time, becomes the biggest former 
savings bank intervention carried to date.A key figure in this development is the formerPresident 
of Bankia, Rodrigo Rato.  Rato was Minister of the Economy in Spain from 1996 to 2004, 
Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) from 2004 to 2007, who assumed 
the presidency of the main savings bank in the Bankia merger (Caja Madrid), and resigned on 
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May 7, 2012.  By July 4th, 2012, Rato had been charged with accounting irregularities, along 
with thirty other former members of the board of directors of Bankia. 
 
05.11.2012 - The then new Spanish government takes another step in this restructuring of banks 
with a new Royal Decree Law on the reorganization and sale of real estate assets in the financial 
sector, with the aim of cleaning up and protecting the balance sheets of banks to promote new 
risk-taking operations.  
This new reform also includes the creation of "bad banks" in order to group toxic assets and to 
require higher provisions for entities to ensure their viability. 
It also raises the general provision of the loan portfolio and real estate assets of the banking 
unproblematic (123,000 million Euros), which will mean around 30,000 million Euros of new 
banknotes that will have to be made before December 31 of that year. 
These write downs join the 54,000 million Euros and made after the approval of Royal Decree 
Law February financial reform, so that the total sanitation made will be placed near the 84,000 
million Euros. 
 
05.29.2012 - The Ibercaja savings bank, Caja3 savings bank and Liberbank  boards, approve the 
protocol integration to create the seventh largest Spanish financial group. 
 
06.08.2012 - The Spanish government announced a third round of write downs pending to be 
analysed about the sector. 
 
07.10.2012 - The Mediterranean savings Bank-CAM is merged with Sabadell bank and 
disappears after 137 years of existence. Banco Sabadell acquires Banco CAM. 
 
11.27.2012 - Caixabank purchases Banco de Valencia from the former Bankia Group. 
 
As shown in the timelines, the end result of all these years of changing models could not have 
been more catastrophic, the fourth largest financial entity nationalized (Bankia, only behind 
BSCH, BBVA and La Caixa savings bank), the foreclosure of the savings banks social system in 
favour of a solely commercial banking system.  In other words, the model that had taken more 
than two centuries to build, took less than a decade and a half to ground it. 
After the merger, Bankia was initially owned by a holding company named Banco Financiero y 
de Ahorros (BFA), and the seven banks controlled BFA. The most toxic assets from the banks 
were transferred to this new bank BFA, which obtained 4.5 billion euros from the Spanish 
government rescue fund FROB in exchange for preference shares, so the resulting new entity is 
now BFA-Bankia. 
A large amount of literature has been published only acknowledging the abovementioned causes 
(Caja Meri et al., 2008; Pérez 2011; Pons 2011) for example have contributed in several 
fundamental analyses of the matter at hand),of this financial development, yet, as we will see in 
our paper, this has not only been the sole reason, but, among many others, show the lack of 
general knowledge that general public had of the financial market in Spain. 
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Figure 2. Chronological Evolution of the M&A operations in the Spanish banking system 
(Second stage from 2010 to 2012). 
 
 
 
3. THE RISK UNDERTAKEN IN SOME FINANCIAL AND REAL ESTATE ASSETS 
AND THEIR BANKING EFFECTS IN SPAIN IN 2008-2011 
Although many circumstances and factors (both internal and external), can be related to the actual 
evolution of the banking system in Spain, one that is sometimes forgotten or set aside is the 
amount of risk that mostly savings banks, contrary to their own financial model and contrary to 
their own business procedure (in most cases as a consequence from their regional-political 
control and supervision) ended up by absorbing operations that after some time resulted in total 
investment failure and a severe and long-term harmful effect on their equity. 
If we were to analyse the total assets of each bank (that we shall represent by the size of the 
circle) and measure the TIER 1 mass on the Y axis, while at the same time, on the Xaxis we 
could in contrast measure the doubtful risks ratios and rankings back in 2008, this was the 
graph
1
 the Spanish financial sector was representing: 
 
 
Chronological Evolution
Caja España de Inversiones, Salamanca y Soria - (Caja España and Caja Duero )
Banca Cívica - (Caja Navarra, Caja Canarias and Caja de Burgos)
CajaSol - (Merges with  Caja Guadalajara )
Unicaja - (Marges with  Caja de Jaén )
Catalunya Caixa - (Cajas Rurales de Cataluña, Manresa  and Tarragona )
Caja España Duero - (Caja España and Caja Duero)
Caja3 - (Caja Inmaculada, Caja Círculo y Caja Badajoz)
NovaCaixaGalicia - (Caixanova and Caixa Galicia)
Unnim - (Cajas Rurales de Sabadell, Terrasa and Manlleu )
Fusion between Cajasur and Unicaja - (BE takes over Cajasur ) - FAIL
La Caixa absorbs Caja Girona
Bankia – (Caja Madrid, Bancaja, Caja Laietana, Caja Canaria, Caja Segovia y Caja Rioja)
Sabadell-CAM – (Banco Sabadell absorbs Caja de Ahorros del Mediterráneo CAM)
Banco Mare Nostrum – (Caja Murcia, Caja Penedés, Sa Nostra, Caja Granada)
Liberbank – (Cajastur, Caja Castilla La Mancha, Caja Cantabria, Caja Extremadura)
Kutxabank – (BBK, Cajasur, Kutxa, Banco Vital)
Bankia  is nationalized
La Caixa is fused with Banca Cívica
Liberbank is fused with Caja3
2010
2011
2012
 Business Systems Review, ISSN: 2280-3866  
Volume 3, Issue 1 
 January - June 2014  
 
 
This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 Unported License. To view a copy of this license, visit http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3 
 
10 
Figure 3. Tier 1 Ratio of the Spanish Banking Sector in 2008. 
 
In this case, we can clearly see that minor (small to mid-sized financial players such as CCM, 
Caixa Catalunya or Caja Madrid) were taking a larger-than average risk on their daily 
operations, were as by their TIER 1 ratio (established
2
 as the core measure of a bank's financial 
strength from a regulator's point of view and composed of equity capital and published reserves 
from post-tax retained earnings) they were not extremely more funded than other entities nor 
were their assets larger than others with the same investment and doubtful risk operations 
amount. 
From 2008 and by 2009 we were observing a tendency not to reduce risk, but to stretch further on 
more risky operations by compensating on the core capital values. (Y axis Tier 1; X axis, 
doubtful and risk operations). 
 
Figure 4. Tier 1 Ratio of the Spanish Banking Sector in 2009 with CCM. 
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Then again, in 2009, CCM statistically shows a far larger Doubtful Risk Ratio, and therefore, we 
had to recreate the graph without CCM, the result is shown below: 
 
Figure 5. Tier 1 Ratio of the Spanish Banking Sector in 2009 without CCM. 
 
 
By 2010 (below) with many M&A operations already undertaken, the overall risk was slightly 
reduced, although we could clearly see that two entities, Caja España-Duero and CAM were out 
of the scale in risk terms. 
 
Figure 6. Tier 1 Ratio of the Spanish Banking Sector in 2010. 
 
 
Also, by this time, we could see some market trends, such as the smaller risk tendencies by some 
major operators, such as BSCH or even by smaller ones (in comparison) such as BBK and Banca 
March (or Banco March). By this time, we can also clearly see the next to be out of trend as 
Banco de Valencia and Cajasol. 
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12 
In 2011, the market is completely polarised as we can see in the graph below (Y axis Tier 1, X 
axis, doubtful and risk operations): 
 
Figure 7. Tier 1 Ratio of the Spanish Banking Sector in 2011 with CAM. 
 
 
However, the then CAM and Banca March inclusion in the graph distorts the analysis of the 
group, in which case we opted to eliminate such entity, resulting as follows: 
 
Figure 8. Tier 1 Ratio of the Spanish Banking Sector in 2011 without CAM. 
 
 
Finally, in not more than three years, we can clearly conclude that the risk that had already been 
taken by 2008 by several entities (specially the then existing savings banks), was one of the clear 
and main reasons for the latter demise. Also, this explicitly means that all M&A processes taken 
in the 2008-2011 period were utterly insufficient for the reduction to significant levels of all the 
risk in the system and, therefore, were only prolonging the problem and were not the solution of 
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13 
all the financial problems that the new commercial model used by mostly old and insufficiently 
regulated savings banks had approached and developed. 
 
4. MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS (M&A) PROCESSES AND OLIVER-
WYMAN’S REPORT ON SPANISH BANK’S ASSETS 
 
By September 2012
3
, Olive-Wyman’s report, on request of the EU Council to the Government of 
Spain, was published.The report contained Oliver Wyman’s conclusions from the bottom-up 
stress testing analysis undertaken for the Recapitalization and Re-structuring of the Banking 
Sector of the Banco de España and the Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad. The objective 
of this work was to assess the resilience of the Spanish banking system and its ability to 
withstand a severe adverse stress of deteriorating macroeconomic and market conditions, and to 
estimate the capital that each individual bank would require in the event of such an adverse 
scenario. 
Such report was based around the top-down stress-testing exercise conducted in June 2012, in 
which the bottom-up analysis covered fourteen banking groups representing approximately 90% 
of the total domestic credit of the Spanish financial system. The scope of asset coverage also 
remained in the report the same as in the top down exercise and included the domestic lending 
books, excluding other assets, such as foreign assets, fixed income and equity portfolios and 
sovereign borrowing. 
The base and adverse macroeconomic scenarios were also maintained as specified by the 
Strategic Coordination Committee, with an adverse case implying a 6.5% cumulative GDP drop, 
unemployment reaching 27.2% and additional drops in house and land price indices of 25% and 
60% respectively, for the 3 year period from 2012 to 2014. Therefore, it presented a base 
macroeconomic situation (considered likely) and another extremely adverse (considered very 
unlikely), both defined for 2012-2014 period. 
These capital requirements were justified by the relationship between the loss-absorbency and the 
actual institutions’ total losses. These were expressed in terms of the weighty assets by degree of 
risk owned by each entity.  
Having said that, the additional capital requirements of the Spanish banking system, of December 
31, 2011, according to the report amounted to 59,300 million Euros when the integration 
processes ongoing and deferred tax assets weren’t included. If they were to be considered, this 
figure drops to 53,745 million given the ongoing M&A operations tax modifications. 
While the Oliver-Wyman’s report does mention the end result of the M&A operations as stated, it 
didn’t analyse the background of all of them4. Since they have been part of the problem, the 
solution or both, we consider it to be of the utmost importance not only to analyse all of the most 
important ones, but also to synthesize the final results and effects of all of them. 
 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
The private sector credit availability and state tax demand have changed abruptly in these last few 
years, and to date, signs of an internal crisis have been constantly appearing, both in Spain and in 
the Valencian Community. The credit in Spain as a whole is following a trend of sharp correction 
contractions due to the sum of two factors. First, due to exogenous factors, such as restricting 
international liquidity resulting from the international crisis, which are affecting the uptake of 
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external resources. Second, by endogenous factors, resulting from the contraction of the domestic 
market (such as tax increases) and strong positions of financial institutions in the construction 
and domestic sectors.  This turn of events of the last few years has resulted in a downturn, with 
negative values which minimum reached in October 2010, with a variation of -3.8%, the credit 
liquidity in the system.  
If we look closely at the financial credit availability and absorption in the marketin the 2008-2011 
period, credit cooperatives are the only type of entity with positive values, all being stable at 
around 1%, while banks had shown negative values until the summer of 2010, with variation 
which evolves positively, reaching the value of 4.86% in December 2010. Finally, due to the 
heavier credit crunch, the savings banks have negative credit values through the period ranging 
from -0.71% to -3.78%. 
Also in the same period, we are able to appreciate the great variation in the granted credit by 
savings banks, from those that had higher positive values in the first half of 2008, to become 
those with a higher decline in credit in the second half of 2010 (38.545 million Euros compared 
to -29.769 million Euros). With regard to banks, the values recovery has seen positive values in 
2010 after the fall semester of the variation in credit suffered in 2009. Finally, the credit 
cooperatives have shown its stable and positive trend in the three years, but with absolute values 
much lower than the banks and savings banks. 
Therefore, we must conclude that all financial institutions have reduced their new credit 
concession, they have closed all financial means to the SMEs, and have only been there for 
precise refinancing procedures. However, those with only restructuring-debt operation and never 
implying the most urgent requirements, were to sustain and develop the industry by lending more 
financial aid, injected via the EU as financial loans to the Spanish banking sector, and through the 
forced restructuring of several failed entities. 
Such changes and market evolutions have collided with the persistent crisis that has hit southern 
Europe and most noticeably, Spain. Also, within Spain, many regions have had severe cuts in 
their public spending against all Keynesian models, yet, the Valencian Community has endured 
even more changes and cuts than other regions not only in Spain but also in Europe. 
These changes have been the cause of the actual financial crisis, internal and external to the 
system, especially important, have been the changes made in several tax structures and in the 
revenue-making-process for some industrial sectors.They have had a direct effect on the change 
in paradigm (adaptation of Jánossy’s 1971 H. model), while existing for the last fifty years, has 
been in extensive and intensive use for the past decade. 
To this extent, during 2012, the Ibex 35 index lost almost five per cent of its value (-4.7%), a far 
lower evolution than the DJ Stoxx Banks (+23.1%) or the DJ Stoxx 50 (+8.8%).  While the real 
economy is failing to grow, the new born Asset Management Company from the Bank 
Restructuring (henceforth, SAREB), a private company established under Law 9/2012 of 14 
November as part of the process of restructuring and consolidation of the Spanish financial 
system, is attempting to maximize the value of assets that the restructuring of the banking 
systems has left out as dubious and high-risk. This new company has its capital provided by 
private entities (55%) and by the Fund for Orderly Bank Restructuring (FROB) as a minority 
(45%).  Its sole purpose to hold and manage directly or indirectly the administration, acquisition 
and disposal of assets to be transferred to the banks, established by the Royal Decree-Law 
24/2012, of 31st August, to restructure banks, that are majority owned by the FROB or deemed 
by the Bank of Spain to require the opening of a restructuring or resolution of under Law 9/2012.  
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The decision by the Bank of Spain is taken after independent assessment of capital needs and 
asset quality of the Spanish financial system, conducted under the Memorandum of 
understanding signed between Spanish and European authorities on July 20, 2012.  The first case 
included BFA-Bankia, Catalunya Bank, Banco Gallego Novagalicia Bank and Banco de 
Valencia, and the second case, consisted of BMN, Liberbank, Caja3 and CEISS. 
Further exacerbating this macroeconomic and financial breakdown resulting in the present system 
credit-crunch, the two main sectors that thrive in the Valencian Community, the industrial sector 
and the tourist sector, specially this latter one, have been losing their main strengths.  They have 
increased their weaknesses due to new countries offering large competitive leisure and tourist 
packages with an even more competitive currency. 
On the international level, stock markets around the world prepare for one of the best quarters of 
the past 40 years within the Q2 of 2013, with those of the U.S., UK and Japan in the lead, 
specially, regarding equity improvement in various emerging markets and in the U.S. However, 
the local capabilities of the SME’s growth factor in the Valencian Community are still limited to 
credit access and availability. 
Although in the future we shall be able to quantify the financial constraints that end up affecting 
the Valencian Community, we are already able to see that the deep economic crisis in which we 
find ourselves has resulted in a worrying situation for the increasing loss of homes for many 
families who are in serious difficulties in meeting their obligations to return the debt incurred by 
the purchase of their home. And yet, this is just the tip of the iceberg, as currently there are about 
500,000 million Euros of mortgage bonds in Spain as well as Spanish mortgage securitization 
funds distributed worldwide. Notwithstanding, many of these titles serve as collateral in the 
Eurosystem lending operations to our financial institutions, which has become the key funding 
instrument. 
Therefore, what will happen to the regulation affecting the warranty (mortgages) of those 
securities issued could result in a loss of attractiveness of these values and, consequently, a 
further obstacle to the development of not only the Spanish mortgage market, and subsequently, 
reducing the chances of restructuring the financial banks and their debts and liabilities.  
This risk does not only revolve around the already existing situation, it also implies that any 
future growth is compromised by other variables, where the mortgage risk is increasingly high 
and the defaults could increase significantly in the coming months, since any change in the 
mortgage laws should also consider the effects of that risk. The mortgage default in the third 
quarter of 2012 was around the 3.4%, well below the general rate of the banking debtor’s rate of 
11.38%, but it is expected that this percentage will rise as unemployment, according to recent 
studies, will not diminish at least until 2014.  
Finally, we must conclude that the risks that the financial system has taken over these last few 
years were not equally distributed across the entities, resulting in an advanced foreclosure of the 
regional savings banks and in a market-share growth for the commercial banking entities. This 
process has resulted in creating larger entities and in some cases, exponentially, such as in the 
Valencian Community. Moreover, this has created a vacuum of regional and local credit entities 
that in the mid- to long-term will eventually end up in a representative loss on credit availability.  
When added up with the private and domestic sectors, furthermore increased by the 
unemployment rate and the regional and country government indebtedness over these last few 
years, this regional situation reflects the needfor a paradigm shift and most importantly, new 
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approaches that can result, both nationally and regionally, in the fluidity of the financial system 
and the eventual recovery of the economy. 
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Endnotes 
1
 This initial study was published by the financial newspaper ”Expansión” back in 2009 with data from Central Bank 
of Spain of the year before and extracting data from the Spanish Market and Values Commission (CNMV, the 
Comisión Nacional del Mercado de Valores is the regulatory body of the Spanish Stock Market) following graphs 
are of the same source, own elaboration. 
2
 International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards, “Basel Capital Accord I”, July 1988 
(http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/bulletin/2003/0903lead.pdf & http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsc111.pdf). 
3
 On September 28th 2012 the Central bank of Spain (BDE) released a note about the report, however, the full report 
was disclosed a couple of days later. 
4
 Sources: Central bank of Spain (BDE), Spanish Market and Values Commission (CNMV), Oliver-Wyman’s report. 
Own elaboration. 
